Hindsight, foresight, and having it both ways: A rejoinder to R. L. Spitzer

John Z. Sadler, Joseph F. Hulgus, George J. Agich

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Using the methods of philosophical analysis, we provide a rejoinder to R. L. Spitzer's (2001) response to our own consideration of the DSMs first published in 1994. Then as now, our major contention has been that the DSM contents and process have been insufficiently explicit in their various value commitments, choices, and decisions. Spitzer raises four major points in his commentary, concerning our claims about the "value naivete" of past DSMs, his contention that the goals of DSM-III and III-R were not "inherently" in conflict, about our allegations of the DSM architects preferring reliability over validity, and various DSM critics' failure to offer a viable alternative to the DSMs. We address each of Spitzer's main points in turn, appealing to Spitzer's own work while acknowledging his leadership role in addressing value issues in mental disorder classification.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)493-497
Number of pages5
JournalJournal of Nervous and Mental Disease
Volume189
Issue number8
DOIs
StatePublished - 2001

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Reproducibility of Results
Mental Disorders
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
Conflict (Psychology)

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychiatry and Mental health

Cite this

Hindsight, foresight, and having it both ways : A rejoinder to R. L. Spitzer. / Sadler, John Z.; Hulgus, Joseph F.; Agich, George J.

In: Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol. 189, No. 8, 2001, p. 493-497.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Sadler, John Z. ; Hulgus, Joseph F. ; Agich, George J. / Hindsight, foresight, and having it both ways : A rejoinder to R. L. Spitzer. In: Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. 2001 ; Vol. 189, No. 8. pp. 493-497.
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