Theories of bias in probability judgment

Michael H. Birnbaum, Carolyn J. Anderson, Linda G. Hynan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When psychologists study human judgments of probability, judged probabilities unfortunately do not conform to the equations of probability theory. Because probability theory offers such a convenient and compelling structure for discussing beliefs about ambiguous and uncertain events, many scholars have found it disturbing to think that humans might have been rational enough to invent probability theory but not rational enough to use it in their daily thought. This chapter will explore explanations of the discrepancies between judged probabilities and the implications of probability theory.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)477-498
Number of pages22
JournalAdvances in Psychology
Volume68
Issue numberC
DOIs
StatePublished - 1990

Fingerprint

Probability Theory
Psychology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

Theories of bias in probability judgment. / Birnbaum, Michael H.; Anderson, Carolyn J.; Hynan, Linda G.

In: Advances in Psychology, Vol. 68, No. C, 1990, p. 477-498.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Birnbaum, Michael H. ; Anderson, Carolyn J. ; Hynan, Linda G. / Theories of bias in probability judgment. In: Advances in Psychology. 1990 ; Vol. 68, No. C. pp. 477-498.
@article{7e9ddabe6d2d4fd58725c4271c199688,
title = "Theories of bias in probability judgment",
abstract = "When psychologists study human judgments of probability, judged probabilities unfortunately do not conform to the equations of probability theory. Because probability theory offers such a convenient and compelling structure for discussing beliefs about ambiguous and uncertain events, many scholars have found it disturbing to think that humans might have been rational enough to invent probability theory but not rational enough to use it in their daily thought. This chapter will explore explanations of the discrepancies between judged probabilities and the implications of probability theory.",
author = "Birnbaum, {Michael H.} and Anderson, {Carolyn J.} and Hynan, {Linda G.}",
year = "1990",
doi = "10.1016/S0166-4115(08)61338-2",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "68",
pages = "477--498",
journal = "Advances in Psychology",
issn = "0166-4115",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "C",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Theories of bias in probability judgment

AU - Birnbaum, Michael H.

AU - Anderson, Carolyn J.

AU - Hynan, Linda G.

PY - 1990

Y1 - 1990

N2 - When psychologists study human judgments of probability, judged probabilities unfortunately do not conform to the equations of probability theory. Because probability theory offers such a convenient and compelling structure for discussing beliefs about ambiguous and uncertain events, many scholars have found it disturbing to think that humans might have been rational enough to invent probability theory but not rational enough to use it in their daily thought. This chapter will explore explanations of the discrepancies between judged probabilities and the implications of probability theory.

AB - When psychologists study human judgments of probability, judged probabilities unfortunately do not conform to the equations of probability theory. Because probability theory offers such a convenient and compelling structure for discussing beliefs about ambiguous and uncertain events, many scholars have found it disturbing to think that humans might have been rational enough to invent probability theory but not rational enough to use it in their daily thought. This chapter will explore explanations of the discrepancies between judged probabilities and the implications of probability theory.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77956721407&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77956721407&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0166-4115(08)61338-2

DO - 10.1016/S0166-4115(08)61338-2

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:77956721407

VL - 68

SP - 477

EP - 498

JO - Advances in Psychology

JF - Advances in Psychology

SN - 0166-4115

IS - C

ER -