### Abstract

When psychologists study human judgments of probability, judged probabilities unfortunately do not conform to the equations of probability theory. Because probability theory offers such a convenient and compelling structure for discussing beliefs about ambiguous and uncertain events, many scholars have found it disturbing to think that humans might have been rational enough to invent probability theory but not rational enough to use it in their daily thought. This chapter will explore explanations of the discrepancies between judged probabilities and the implications of probability theory.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 477-498 |

Number of pages | 22 |

Journal | Advances in Psychology |

Volume | 68 |

Issue number | C |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Jan 1990 |

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Psychology(all)

## Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Theories of bias in probability judgment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

## Cite this

Birnbaum, M. H., Anderson, C. J., & Hynan, L. G. (1990). Theories of bias in probability judgment.

*Advances in Psychology*,*68*(C), 477-498. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-4115(08)61338-2